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Abstract
The architecture of a system is decided at the initial stage of the design. However, the
robustness of the system is not usually assessed in detail during the initial stages, and
the exploration of alternative system architectures is limited due to the influence of
previous designs and opinions. This article presents a novel network generator that enables
the analysis of the robustness of alternative system architectures in the initial stages of
design. The generator is proposed as a network tool for system architectures dictated
by their configuration of source and sink components structured in a way to deliver
a particular functionality. Its parameters allow exploration with theoretical patterns to
define the main structure and hub structure, vary the number, size, and connectivity of
hub components, define source and sink components and directionality at the hub level
and adapt a redundancy threshold criterion. The methodology in this article assesses the
system architecture patterns through robustness and modularity network based metrics
and methods. Two naval distributed engineering system architectures are examined as
the basis of reference for the simulated networks. The generator provides the capacity to
create alternative complex system architecture options with identifiable patterns and key
features, aiding in a broader explorative and analytical, in-depth, time and cost-efficient
initial design process.
Key words: network generator, robustness, modularity, system architecture patterns,
network science
1. Introduction
The architecture of a system is formed by decisions taken during the initial design
stage and affects the system throughout its lifecycle. Elias & Jain (2017) advised
that ‘a system’s architecture profoundly influences the cost and success of a system
throughout the entire lifecycle and the business processes it supports’. Crawley
et al. (2004) define a system’s architecture as ‘an abstract description of the entities
of a system and the relationships between those entities’. Wyatt et al. (2012)
define a product’s architecture analogously as ‘a model of engineering artefact
in terms of components linked by relations’. A system’s architecture (structure)
realises behaviour that satisfies intended functions (Gero & Kannengiesser 2004).
The architecture decides the characteristics of the system termed also as its
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attributes, lifecycle properties or ilities such as flexibility, robustness, reliability and
modularity, which are widely discussed in the engineering system literature (De
Weck, Ross & Rhodes 2012). Different patterns of system architectures exist that
can satisfy a desired function, which could be characterised by different attributes.
There are various challenges in establishing analytical and systematic
approaches to formulate, analyse, evaluate and select the system’s architecture
in the early stages to accomplish the desired attributes. The first challenge is the
low fidelity of available information or details about the system; the second is
the establishment of high-level representations to model and study them. Also,
explorative design of a system’s architecture is often influenced by previous
designs and intuitive expert opinions, which can cause design fixation effects
(Purcell & Gero 1996). Additionally, the methods to perform analysis at the
conceptual stages of system architectures are not quantitative (Elias & Jain
2017), and usually they examine the subsystems or specific attributes of a system
(Zakarian, Knight & Baghdasaryan 2007; De Weck et al. 2012) causing them to
be insufficient to manage the high-level abstraction of the system architecture
and to examine the attributes of the architecture in combination. In view of the
increasing challenges and complexity of modern engineering systems, network
modelling and analysis is recommended in design research (Chen et al. 2018).
Its application is an area of research that is continuously expanding (Braha &
Bar-Yam2004a, 2007; Baldwin,Maccormack&Rusnak 2014; Parraguez, Eppinger
&Maier 2015; Piccolo, Lehmann &Maier 2018), contributing to the development
of new solutions that address engineering design problems.
This article presents a network generator, which is incorporated into the
methodology of this article, which evaluates two attributes: modularity and
robustness of technical and theoretical patterns. The generator has been developed
as a network tool by combining knowledge of heuristics, literature-based
engineering systems and network science and can be applied to system
architectures dictated by their configuration of source and sink components
structured in away to deliver a particular functionality. The generator is developed
to populate directed networks with source and sink nodes enabling robustness
analysis. The simulated networks have generic similarities with engineering
system networks. Two naval distributed engineering systems are studied as a
point of reference as they are complex robust engineering systems.
The article is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the aim and objectives
of this article. Section 3 presents a literature background on the network
generator, patterns and key features, assessment, modelling andmetrics of system
architectures. Section 4 introduces the methodology of this article and explains
the modularity and robustness metrics and methods of the assessment. Section 5
presents the preliminary work on the two naval distributed engineering systems.
Section 6 explains the development of the generator and Section 7 presents the
application of the network generator and discusses the assessment results of
various simulated networks. Section 8 presents a redesign of the original naval
distributed engineering system based on the experimental findings of Section 7.
Finally, Sections 8 and 9 provide reflections, limitations and conclusions.
2. Research aim and objectives
The research study reported in this article aims to develop a network tool for
simulating networks, allowing experimentation with various patterns and key
2/40
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/dsj.2020.6
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 80.6.87.97, on 16 Apr 2020 at 11:42:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
engineering features, as an aid in analysing and improving the robustness of
system architectures in initial design stages. To achieve this aim, the following
objectives are defined as guidelines for the structure of this article:
(a) Identify patterns and features of system architectures.
(b) Develop a generator into a computation tool.
(c) Define the robustness and modularity assessment metrics and methods
(d) Apply the generator to perform various experiments.
(e) Develop a redesign example based on the experimental findings.
3. Literature background
This section provides a background to the literature on the generation and
assessment of system architectures. It also presents the key concepts and elements
employed in the development of the novel generator. Assessment of the system
architectures focus on two properties: modularity and robustness, which are
subsequently discussed. Finally, network modelling is proposed as the approach
to model and analyse system architectures, and network-based metrics for
modularity and robustness are reviewed.
3.1. Network generators
Network science is a field that contributes to the development of generators for
experimental and analysis purposes. Albert & Barabási (2002) originally proposed
a network model that generates scale-free networks that represent various real-
world systems. In the communication-network literature, and particularly in
relation to the internet, various works include network topology generators. An
internet topology generator is a research tool to evaluate new application designs
and system architectures and is often used in network research (Jin, Chen &
Jamin 2000; Çetinkaya et al. 2011; Sterbenz et al. 2013). The generation allows
simulations and experimentations, aiding understanding and analysis of the
properties of the networks, by enabling the population of alternative topologies for
evaluation and comparison purposes. Besides communication systems, and the
internet examples, other engineering system studies have explored the advantages
of using network generation. de Vos & Stapersma (2018) developed a generator
for on-board energy-distribution systems using heuristic engineering knowledge
in the context of ship distributed engineering systems.
Studies in the engineering design domain have also proposed computational
network-generation approaches. Wyatt et al. (2012) proposed a computational
support method for generating new concepts through design synthesis with
network structure constraints. Moullec et al. (2013) proposed a system
architecture generation using Bayesian networks. Luo (2015) developed a network
generator to examine the impact of product architecture on evolvability. These
are only some examples justifying the usefulness and utility of a generator in the
context of system architectures. In line with these examples, this research proposes
a novel network generator as a tool to analyse and improve robustness of system
architectures. The advantages of developing a generator for the initial stages of
design relate to the ability to analyse and examine the parameters of system
architectures based on low fidelity of information. The key concepts that led to
the development of the generator in this article are discussed in the following.
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3.2. Patterns and key features of system architectures
The following sections provide a background on the patterns and key features
(hub, source and sink) that led to the conception and development of the generator
presented in Section 6.
3.2.1. Patterns
Alexander (1964) notably identified the concept of patterns as ‘the idea that
is possible to create such abstract relationships one at a time and to create
designs which are whole by fusing these relationships’. Minai, Braha & Bar-
Yam (2006) stated that ‘pattern formation is an integral part of most complex
systems’ functionality’. Various studies have adopted and discussed patterns in the
literature. Rivkin & Siggelkow (2007) explored patterns for decision-making in
complex systems and Selva, Cameron & Crawley (2016) proposed using patterns
in system architecture decision-making. Hölttä-Otto et al. (2012) used patterns
to study various modularity metrics, given that the degree of modularity of
the various patterns could be anticipated. Min et al. (2016) used engineering
patterns to study structural complexity, while Sharman&Yassine (2004) discussed
various patterns to characterise complex product architectures, and Yassine &
Naoum-Sawaya (2016) employed patterns to examine architecture, performance
and investment in product development networks. Baldwin et al. (2014) proposed
a methodology to identify hidden patterns in system architectures that was
based on directed graphs, which allows the identification of direct and indirect
dependencies. In their approach, they define three fundamental key patterns: core
periphery, multi-core and hierarchical (Baldwin et al. 2014). For the engineering
design process, Parraguez et al. (2015) used expected patterns characterised by
network metrics and compared with empirical data to characterised by network
metrics and compared with empirical data to analyse the flow of information
through a complex project. In the field of applied engineering, in the context
of early-stage ship design, Chalfant & Chryssostomidis (2017) proposed using
patterns to provide ‘a high-level view of a system or portion of a system, consisting
of a connected set of functional blocks plus general design rules and guidelines of
creating a system’. Table 1 presents various patterns found in the literature.
3.2.2. Key features
Key components of system architectures can be characterised as hubs, sources
or sinks, depending on their function in the system architecture. This
characterisation of components at the initial stages of design can provide
high-level information about the role of the component in the system architecture,
without the need for specific details. By designing an architecture referring, for
example, to a hub component instead of a switchboard or a source component
instead of a generator, a generic hub–source–sink architecture can be devised,
allowing the details to be decided at later stages.
3.2.2.1. Hubs
Sosa, Mihm & Browning (2011) explained that ‘complex engineered systems
tend to have architectures in which a small subset of components exhibits a
disproportional number of linkages’. Such components are known as hubs. Sosa
et al. (2011) studied the effects of hubs on quality (measured as the number of
defects) based on empirical data. They found that there is an optimum number of
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Table 1. Patterns in the literature
Reference Type of patterns
(Sharman and Yassine, 2004) Simple bus, multiple bus, auxiliary or weak
or subsidiary buses, planar triangular
clusters, tetrahedron of clusters, three-level
design hierarchy.
(Yassine and Naoum-Sawaya,
2016)
Random, diagonal, block diagonal, local,
hierarchical, dependent, small world,
scale-free
(Hölttä-Otto et al., 2012) Integral, bus-like, modular
(Min et al., 2016) Integral, linear-modular, bus-modular
(Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2007) Random, local, small-world, block-diagonal,
preferential attachment, scale-free,
centralised, hierarchical, diagonal,
dependent
(Glazier et al., 2015) Ring, mesh, star, fully connected, line, tree
bus
(Selva et al., 2016) Combining, assigning, partitioning,
down-selecting, connecting (bus and star,
ring, mesh tree), permuting
(Baldwin et al., 2014) Core periphery, multi-core, hierarchical
hubs that will give a positive influence on quality, highlighting the importance of
the management of hubs during the early design stages.
Network science studies of hubs in engineering systems include Braha &
Bar-Yam (2004a, 2007), Mehrpouyan et al. (2014), Braha (2016) and Piccolo et al.
(2018). Specifically, studies (Braha & Bar-Yam 2004a; Piccolo et al. 2018) found
that the engineering design process exhibits right skewed degree distribution,
meaning a network with few high-degree nodes while the remaining nodes have
low-degree nodes. In network science, scale-free networks with right skewed
degree distribution are found to be highly robust against random disruptions,
however vulnerable to failure in the event of target disruption (Albert, Jeong
& Barabási 2000). Similar findings in the engineering design literature were
confirmed for large-scale engineering design projects involving activities and
people (Braha & Bar-Yam 2007; Piccolo et al. 2018).
The existence of hubs relates also to other network properties such as
disassortativity and rich club. Braha (2016) found that ‘complex engineering
networks tend to be uncorrelated or disassortative’, explaining that this
characteristic ‘decrease the likelihood that the project spirals out of control’.
Rich-club phenomenon characterises networks with interconnections among
its hubs. Zhou & Mondragón (2004) investigated internet topologies, claiming
that ‘the connectivity between rich nodes can be crucial for network properties,
such as network routing efficiency, redundancy, and robustness’. Findings from
the literature agree on the focus on hubs for the development of improvement
approaches (Piccolo et al. 2018).
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The definition of a hub suggested in this article is that a node is a hub if its
degree is proportionally greater than the average of its neighbours. The notion of
defining hubs as high-degree nodes when compared to neighbours is different
from the definition adopted in scale-free networks with a power-law degree
distribution that suggests that relatively high-degree nodes are automatic hubs. It
is argued that the importance of a hub is due to its position in the neighbourhood
of a network and cannot be directly inferred from the degree of distribution. As
the hub is a key feature of systems, it was therefore chosen as a parameter in the
development of the network generator described in this article.
3.2.2.2. Sources and sinks
A source component supplies energy, material or information to the sink
components and is a feature of flow systems. The source and sink concept is used
in engineering in reliability, robustness, and resilience work (Pumpuni-Lenss,
Blackburn&Garstenauer 2017; deVos&Stapersma 2018).Max-flowoptimisation
problems use the concept of the source and sink (Pumpuni-Lenss et al. 2017)
in improving the resilience of complex engineering systems, as well as studies
of reliability (Chao, Fu & Koutras 1995). Goodrum, Shields & Singer (2018)
considered ‘directed connectivity analyses, as well as sink–source flow analyses’.
Chalfant & Chryssostomidis (2011) assessed electrical flow by employing the
max-flow, min-cost algorithm. In the max-flow problem, sources supply a flow
whereas sinks demand a flow, and the aim is ‘to transport all the flow from the
supply nodes to the demand nodes at minimum cost’ (Selva et al. 2016). In terms
of reliability, the literature suggests that ‘the system is functioning if there is a
connection from source to sink through working components’ (Shanthikumar
1987; Chao et al. 1995). Moreover, hubs are noted as components between sources
and sinks in distribution engineering system architectures (de Vos & Stapersma
2018).
In summary, theoretical patterns, hubs, sources and sinks are the key concepts
used in the development of the novel generator (Section 6).
3.3. Assessment of system architectures
The architecture of an engineering system is analogous to a structural solution
formulated during the synthesis process that intends to satisfy an overall function
(Gero &Kannengiesser 2004). The International Council on Systems Engineering
Walden et al. (2015) describes the architecting of systems as ‘an analysis of
interactions between system elements to prevent undesirable properties and
reinforce desirable ones’. Typically, complex engineering systems consist of
subsystems that are designed independently by different disciplines and are
integrated together at the later stages of the design process. As a result, the complex
system architecture is not intentionally formulated and the analysis and evaluation
of desirable and undesirable properties may not take place at an early stage,
leading to costly and time-consuming reformulations at later stages of design.
The methodology of this article assesses two desirable attributes of the system,
modularity and robustness, which are suggested to be assessed during the initial
stages of the design.
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3.3.1. Assessment attributes: modularity and robustness
Modularity and robustness are typically desired attributes, are at times conflicting
(Walsh, Dong & Tumer 2019) and are analysed in isolation during the design
process. Baldwin & Clark (2000) defined modularity as ‘a property of a system
where the system can be divided into a different number of chunks called
modules, which have strong intra-connections within the individual module and
weak interconnections between modules’. Modularity is discussed widely as a
beneficial property in the literature (Gershenson, Prasad &Zhang 2003).Modular
architectures facilitate concurrent design and development and early testing and
can be advantageous for lifetime operation andmaintenance due to future savings
in terms of repairs, replacements and reuse (Meehan, Duffy & Whitfield 2007).
The design of a modular architecture can, however, lead to a more complex
development due to the technological, planning and organisational requirements
(Albers et al. 2019). Another profoundly essential attribute ofmodern engineering
systems is robustness. Fricke & Schulz (2005) defined robustness as a ‘system’s
ability to be insensitive towards changing environments’. Robustness is related
to the survivability, changeability and resilience of systems (Fricke & Schulz
2005; Department of Defense 2011; Kott & Abdelzaher 2016). The need for
robust systems is attributed to the management of their complex interdependence
network, as ‘system robustness is a feature that consists of a comprehensive
combination of system elements’ (Elmaraghy et al. 2012).
This article’s methodology (Section 4) defines modularity and robustness as
the main assessment attributes as these are two critical and perhaps conflicting
attributes of engineering systems.
3.4. System architecture modelling and metrics
Design structure matrix (DSM) modelling approaches are widely applied
in engineering systems to represent the structures of product and system
architectures and are valuable for modelling and analysis purposes (Eppinger
& Browning 2012; Browning 2015). The DSM is simple to understand as a square
matrix illustrating the relationships between matching elements positioned in the
rows and columns of the matrix and offers an efficient and effective way to model
and analyse systems. The relationships included in a component-based DSM
relate with design dependencies such as spatial, energy, material and information
(Pimmler & Eppinger 1994), and can be symmetrical or asymmetrical (Sosa,
Eppinger & Rowles 2003). The majority of component-based DSMs are built
based on a symmetric premise (non-directional) since the configuration of
symmetric DSMs is simpler (Helmer, Yassine & Meier 2010). Most DSM analysis
studies to date have focused on clustering components for modular architecture
determination (Browning 2015). Researchers have also employed product DSMs
to determine architecture patterns such asmodules and cycles (Sharman&Yassine
2004; Fixson 2005; Sosa, Mihm & Browning 2013). The DSM is a useful way to
represent a network, facilitating the application of network-based approaches
(Sosa, Eppinger & Rowles 2007; Baldwin et al. 2014; Sarkar et al. 2014). Network
science is the study of networks represented as nodes (vertices) of elements and
edges (arcs) as the connections between the elements. Parraguez & Maier (2016)
provided an overview of the challenges and key decisions when using network
science to support design research. They advise that the first decision is to define
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the overall research purpose (exploratory or explanatory) and the second is
to select relevant network features. In line with the Parraguez & Maier (2016)
guidelines, the research study report in this article has an exploratory nature,
and the network conceptualisation of complex systems is unweighted (binary)
and directed to enable robustness assessment. The following sections discuss
network-based metrics for modularity and robustness.
3.4.1. Modularity network based metrics
Network average nodal degree is suggested in the literature as a reverser indicator
of modularity (Luo 2015). Sinha (2014) calculated modularity by adopting
Newman’s modularity index (Q). Braha & Bar-Yam (2004a) proposed the
clustering coefficient as a measure of the potential modularity of complex design
networks. Sosa et al. (2007) proposed a network approach to measure component
modularity using various networkmetrics such as degree and centrality. Parraguez
et al. (2015) used in combination centrality metrics and clustering coefficient to
determine the level of process modularity in complex engineering design projects,
stressing that it is difficult to evaluate global network topology properties such as
modularity, where either centrality or clusteringmetrics are calculated in isolation.
Section 4.2.1 elaborates further on the selectedmodularitymetric that is employed
to quantitatively assess the modularity of the networks.
3.4.2. Robustness network based metrics
The most popular network science metrics discussed in the engineering system
literature relate to algebraic connectivity, average path length and largest
connected component. Algebraic connectivity is a network metric related to
robustness. According to Mehrpouyan et al. (2014), ‘algebraic connectivity is
a good metric to be considered to determine the resilience of architecture
of complex systems’. Yazdani & Jeffrey (2012) recommended an algebraic
connectivity metric to measure the structural robustness of water distribution
systems. However, algebraic connectivity is calculated while the network is intact,
as a structural metric, and does not capture the behaviour after a disruption.
Walsh, Dong & Tumer (2018) used the network average shortest path length
metric to study the function of bridging components in engineering systems.
Dynamic robustness has been studied by Braha & Bar-Yam (2007, 2004b),
Piccolo et al. (2018) using the largest connected component, demonstrating
that design networks are highly robust under random disruption but are highly
vulnerable under targeted disruption. Paparistodimou et al. (2020) proposed a
network-basedmetric tailored for a distributed engineering system that has source
and sink components to study robustness. This metric is employed to assess the
robustness of system architectures, as is further discussed in Section 4.2.2.
4. Methodology
The methodology of this article is structured as follows. Section 4.1 outlines the
inputs of the methodology. Section 4.2 explains the modularity and robustness
metrics, which are used to evaluate the technical and theoretical networks.
Section 4.3 provides information on the computational implementation of the
methodology.
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4.1. Inputs
The inputs of the methodology are defined as the networks: technical systems
or theoretical patterns. The technical systems are described in more detail in
Section 5 and are developed through data collected from the naval engineering
systems. Inputs for the methodology also become the various simulated networks
populated by the network generator (Section 7).
4.2. Assessment metrics and methods
The assessment part of the methodology is based on representing system
architecture as a network, and computing modularity and robustness using the
network metrics that function as evaluation indicators. The following sections
describe the adopted methods and metrics.
4.2.1. Modularity metric and method
The Louvain community detection method is used to identify a modular
configuration, in combination with a normalised Newman modularity index
proposed byMagee,Whitney &Moses (2010). The Louvain community detection
method (Blondel et al. 2008) is used to find the modules, and there is no
requirement to define the number of modules. A subgraph is considered as a
community if the density of interactions is higher than what could be anticipated
in a random graph. The communities (modules) are discovered using spectral
modularity maximisation established by the Louvain method. This method
searches for communities/modules c1, c2. . . cp that maximise a quality function
Q, known as modularity, defined as
Q = 1
2m
∑
i j
(
Ai j − kik j2m
)
δ(ci , cj), (1)
where m is the number of edges, δ(m, n) is the Kronecker delta, Ai j are entries
of the adjacency matrix and k is the degree of the node. Positive contributions
to Q occur when an edge in the network connects nodes assigned to the same
community. The quantity kik j/2m is the probability of an edge occurring in a
random network with the same degree of distribution; thus, Q is sizeable only if
there is a preponderance of like-to-like connections. Q is normalised to give values
lying between −1 and 1. This quality function can be used for both unweighted
and weighted networks. The Louvain community method output is a community
(module), which is then used as the input to calculate the modularity metric.
Parraguez et al. (2019) also used the Louvain method to study process modularity
over time, concluding that the method identifies ‘real modules with a high degree
of accuracy’.
Newman’s modularity metric Newman (2010) reflects the quality of division;
therefore, higher values represent a greater readiness to divide the pattern into
modules, which is advantageous. A problem with modularity is that it is difficult
to compare modularity between networks. Magee et al. (2010) suggested a
normalised Newman modularity metric to overcome this. A parameter f is
introduced:
f = 1− (p − 1)
n
, (2)
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where p is the number of communities and n is the total number of edges of the
network. The normalised version of the Newman modularity metric is given by
Qn = Q
f −∑ki=1(a2i ) , (3)
where ai is the fraction of edges with at least one end node inside module i .
4.2.2. Robustness metric and method
The robustnessmetric used is grounded on the principle that a function is satisfied
post disruption if a set of source and sink components maintains a prescribed
level of connectivity. This robustness metric is appropriate for any network
where the ability to communicate between well-separated nodes is of paramount
importance. A detailed description of the robustness metric is presented in the
previous works of Paparistodimou et al. (2018, 2020). In short, sources and sinks
are identified in the DSM, and the level of connectivity between sources and
sinks is measured after a disruption. For robustness, this level must exceed a
user-prescribed redundancy threshold criterion.
To compute the level of robustness, the adjacency matrix A of a network
G is used to construct a new matrix S. This new matrix S is a binary matrix
and catalogues the existence of paths/walks (of any length) between nodes in
the network. One way to determine S is to compute the matrix exponential eA
and let Si j = 1 if and only if the corresponding entry of the exponential is
non-zero, but other techniques can be used too. Labelling the sets of sources
s = {s1, s2, s3, . . . , se} and sinks t = {t1, t2, t3, . . . , tk}, the number of ‘1’s in
the corresponding intersection of rows and columns of S is enumerated. The
proportion of ‘1’s gives a measure of the interconnectivity between the sources
and sinks of the network. This can be recalculated after the network is subject to
disruption (i.e., loss of nodes or edges). This measure works equally on directed
and undirected networks.More precisely, the robustness (Rs,t ) of the intact system
architecture is measured using
Rs,t (G) =
∑e
i=1
∑k
j=1 Si j (si , t j )
ek
. (4)
A disruption (loss of nodes/edges) generates a damaged network, represented by
a network G ′ with adjacency matrix A′. Robustness is recalculated to give
Rs,t (G ′) =
∑e
i=1
∑k
j=1 S′i j (si , t j )
ek
. (5)
Both (4) and (5) can be computed for all non-empty subsets of s and t .
4.2.2.1. Calculating robustness using target and random strategies
The calculation of robustness under random and target strategies is an
approach used in the engineering design literature (Braha & Bar-Yam 2007;
Piccolo et al. 2018). In this article, eccentricity, a concept in network theory, is used
to devise targeted attack scenarios. The eccentricity of a node, v, is the greatest
geodesic distance between node v and any other (the geodesic distance is also
known as the shortest path). The diameter d of a network is defined to be the
maximal value of node eccentricity, and the radius r is the minimum. In targeted
attack scenarios, componentswith the lowest eccentricity are sequentially attacked
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because the lowest eccentricity components are the central components of the
network and represent the core part of the system’s functionality. Compared with
random attacks on networks, targeted attacks tend to be more severe.
4.3. MATLAB computational tool
For the computations, the input used for MATLAB is the adjacency matrix
representing the different networks. A new disrupted adjacency matrix is
generated by removing the nodes in targeted and random attacks. Then,
the robustness metric is calculated using the author’s codes. MIT Strategic
Engineering (2006) and Brain Connectivity Toolbox (Rubinov & Sporns 2010)
codes were also used in order to calculate modularity and perform the target
attacks based on eccentricity.
5. Preliminary work
The empirical work presented in this section included meetings with subject-
matter experts (SMEs) and collection of data from the system design, engineering
drawings and operational requirements. A senior power and propulsion engineer
was involved in the development of binary DSMs for the two technical systems.
These data are used to describe the two technical system architectures with
DSMs. In the DSMs, the notation ‘1’ shows a directed relationship from the row
element to the column element. Network representations were derived based on
the formulated DSMs that are presented in appendix A.
5.1. Technical systems Type A and B
Two warship designs with the same functional requirements were selected for the
empirical work. Type A was an older legacy design and Type B was a modern
design. These ship systems were selected to provide representative complex
systems describing a ship’s systems and operational functions. These included
diesel generators (DGs), high-voltage (HV) and low-voltage (LV) switchboards,
transformers, interconnectors, propulsion motors, electrical distribution centres
(EDCs) and the various auxiliary cooling pumps. In naval design, systems
are inherently highly redundant and robust to satisfy operational needs and
survivability requirements.
Figure 1 depicts the network representation of Type A. Diesel generators
(DGs) (1–4) are the main power source components that supply electrical
power to the ship components via high-voltage switchboards (HV SWBDs),
low-voltage switchboards (LV SWBDs) and EDCs. Propulsion can be provided by
electrical power or from the gas turbines (GTs) and gearbox. Auxiliary systems,
low-pressure seawater system (LPSW) support power and propulsion functions
and chilled-water plants are used for combat systems. Figure 2 shows the Type B
network. Power is generated by two DGs and two GT alternators, which supply
the HV system for the two propulsion motors and via transformers to the
LV system power to the whole ship systems. The GTs are dependent on the
seawater system for cooling (GTCooler andGTModule). The chilled-water plants
cool the transformers, the filters associated with the propulsion motors and the
radar equipment in the fore and aft masts. The auxiliary seawater system cools
propulsion converters and motors.
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Figure 1. Technical network Type A.
Figure 2. Technical network Type B.
Both networks (Figures 1 and 2) are shown to have a cyclical configuration,
reflecting the interdependency of subsystem components. For example, electrical
power generation requires LPSW cooling, but the LPSW pumps require electrical
power to function. Such interdependencies create the cyclical (loop) pattern. The
cyclical pattern enables the functionality of these complex and robust Type A and
B technical systems.
5.2. Robustness and modularity results
This section presents the results of the assessment of the two technical system
architectures based on modularity and robustness metrics and methods. Figure 3
shows the robustness response curves for random and targeted disruptions. For
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Figure 3. Robustness calculations for Type A and B technical systems.
random attacks, Type B is more robust than Type A, consistent with expert
opinion. However, in targeted attacks, the overall response of the two systems
falls rapidly as increasing numbers of nodes are removed. Type B displays better
robust behaviour under attacks when up to four central components are removed;
with five or more, the robustness collapses. Large targeted disruptions suggest
multiple distributed attacks; however, the systems are designed to survive a single
event, meaning that multiple attacks are not representative of the operational
environment.
In naval designs, spatial separation of critical duplicated components
minimises the damage profile and limits the number of nodes lost. The
development of future improved designswith amore linear robustness response to
targeted attacks could provide improved survivability and operational capability
in an evolving threat environment.
Table 2 shows the Newman modularity index for the two architectures.
Type A has a higher degree of modularity, with simpler systems and fewer
interconnections, whereas Type B has a lower modularity, with increased levels
of interconnections (due to additional redundancy) designed to give improved
robustness.
It is observed that efforts to increase the level of robustness through additional
redundancy in Type B lead to a more complex architecture compared to Type A.
TheTypeAdesign is amore compact and less complex distributed systemallowing
to be installed into a smaller platform (less costly solution). The Type B design
requires considerably more volume and is a more complex system due to the need
for higher automation to successfully operate, requiring a larger platform (higher
cost). Even so, Type B is amore robust solution and is amoremodern and advance
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Table 2. Modularity calculations for Type A and B technical systems
Technical systems Modularity
Type A 0.63
Type B 0.48
design. The experts consider that the Type A network has considerable benefits in
respect to cost and operation.
5.3. Empirical observations
The empirical observations presented in this section were derived in a meeting
led by the first author, with participants from industry and academia. A
network science academic, two engineering design academics, one senior power
and propulsion engineer and research and technology engineering manager
deliberated the network representations and the robustness andmodularity results
of Type A and Type B technical systems.While observations 1 (Section 7.2), 2 and
3 (Section 3.2.2) are also found to be mentioned in the literature, observation 4
was established based on the discussion. Following are the four key observations
derived:
(1) The network representations (Figures 1 and 2) are cyclical. This observation
is consistent with identified literature covering other domains such as
mechanical assemblies, electrical circuits and system of system architectures
as discussed in Section 7.2. This suggests that a component-based system
architecture can be designed based on a cyclical main structure pattern.
(2) Main hub components have source and sink components connected to them
and are critical for the robustness of the system. For example, electrical
supply from the generators feeds HV SWBDs representing a source style
hub pattern, whereas EDCs demand from LV SWBDs representing a sink
style hub pattern. This verifies that a source–hub–sink pattern exists in
component-based system architectures.
(3) The level of connectivity between hubs is designed to maintain functionality
after disruption. In Type A and Type B, the hub components have alternative
path connectivity designed for redundancy. This implies that a hub
connectivity pattern occurs in component-based system architecture.
(4) At a lower level of decomposition, hubs display bus-modular, star, or
hierarchical style patterns. This suggests that structural patterns can be
identified at a hub level.
The four empirical observations in combination with the literature findings
on theoretical patterns presented (Section 3.2.1) and hubs, sources and sinks
(Section 3.2.2) stimulated the development of the network generator (Section 6)
and the experiments (Sections 7.1 and 7.2).
6. A novel network generator
This article presents a novel network generator, developed from the relevant
literature on engineering design and network sciences (Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2)
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and with empirical observation of distributed engineering systems (Section 5.3).
While the observations in Section 5.3 were based on naval examples, the generator
has been developed as a network tool that can be applied to system architectures
dictated by their configuration of source and sink components structured in a
way to deliver a particular functionality. The generator does not aim to produce
feasible solutions, but rather, theoretical complex patterns that have similarities
with engineering systems based on minimum detail information. The generator
has the capacity to select theoretical patterns of the main structure, hubs and
parameters of the hubs, such as hub size, density and level of connectivity among
hubs, while classifying the components as sources or sinks combined with a
threshold criterion.
Theoretical patterns are developed in the generator as unweighted networks
whereas directionality is included to create source and sink nodes at the hub level.
Source nodes feed hubs; in contrast, hubs feed the sink nodes. For distributed
engineering systems, the energy, materials and information flow from source to
sink components. It is therefore important to identify this directionality of the
flows in the architecture in order to allow the assessment of robustness.
Nine parameters can be chosen by the user to fine-tune the generator in
order to populate tailored simulated networks. The first two parameters (1 and
2 in Table 4) control the number of nodes and the type of main structure of
the simulated network. The main structure patterns used in parameter 2 of
the generator are presented in Table 3. Min et al. (2016) stated that commonly
‘system architectures are categorized into three different configurations: integral,
linear-modular, and bus-modular architecture . . . many engineering systems are
configured as or resemble one of these architectural configurations to some
degree’. The bus-modular, path, hierarchical and integral patterns were selected
as options based on the engineering design literature (Sharman & Yassine
2004; Hölttä-Otto et al. 2012; Paparistodimou et al. 2017). Additionally, the
cyclical pattern was included as an option based on the observations from
the preliminary empirical investigation (Section 5.3) that were consistent with
references in the literature (Whitney 2003; Agarwal, Pape & Dagli 2014; Chalfant
& Chryssostomidis 2017).
The article suggests that these five main structure pattern options can form
the basis for the creation of various and different style simulated networks,
establishing a broad range of applicability for the proposed generator. The five
network main structure patterns presented (Table 3) were generated based on
DSMs (examples are depicted in appendix B).
The simulated networks can be further tailored using the additional
parameters of the generator. Parameters 3, 4 and 5 in Table 4 determine
the number, density and type of pattern of the hubs, respectively, on the
main structure. The pattern of the hub can be defined to mimic one of the
main structures or can be randomised between pattern options. A level of
randomisation is included in the generator with respect to the position of the hubs
in the main structure. The next two parameters (6 and 7 in Table 4) define the
probability that a hub’s node links to sources or sinks. Nodes with edges pointing
to hubs become sources; nodes pointed to by hubs are sinks. The remaining nodes
of the network are assumed to be intermediate components. Parameter 8 in Table 4
is a redundancy threshold criterion variable that defines the level of redundancy
of the source (e.g., 0.5 indicates double redundancy in the number of sources).
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Table 3. Network generator parameter 2: main structure patterns
Reference Options
(Hölttä-Otto et al. 2012; Sharman and Yassine 2004) Bus modular (BM)
(Hölttä-Otto et al. 2012; Min et al. 2016) Path (P)
(Baldwin and Clark 2000; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2007;
Sharman and Yassine 2004; Yassine and
Naoum-Sawaya 2016)
Hierarchical (HI)
(Hölttä-Otto et al. 2012; Sharman and Yassine 2004) Integral (IN)
(Agarwal et al. 2014; Chalfant and Chryssostomidis 2017;
Whitney 2003)
Cyclical (CY)
Table 4. Parameters of network generator
Parameters
1 Number of nodes in the network (n)
2 Type of pattern of the main structure
Bus modular, path, hierarchical, integral, cyclical
3 Number of hubs (k)
4 Density of hubs (mx )
5 Type of pattern of hubs (Ty)
Bus modular, path, hierarchical, integral, cyclical
6 Probability that hub’s nodes are sources (Pso)
7 Probability that hub’s nodes are sinks (Psk)
8 Redundancy threshold criterion (RTC)
9 Level of connectivity among hubs (pal)
The final parameter 9 in Table 4 gives the level of connectivity among hubs
(termed pal). The parameters of the generator are summarised in Table 4. The
simulated networks populated by the network generator are not expected to follow
a power-law degree distribution. Evidence of this is in the findings of the technical
systems previously presented (Type A and B). Previous studies on climate control
and aircraft engine systems (Sosa et al. 2011), bicycle drivetrain, automobile
drivetrain and aircrafts (Walsh et al. 2019) indicate that technical systems do not
always exhibit a power-law degree distribution. Also, the degree distributions of
the design process network studied by Piccolo et al. (2018) were found not to be
power laws.
Section 7 presents various experiments developed by varying the different
parameters of the network generator.
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Table 5. Experimental set-up variable: main structure pattern
Parameters Experimental set-up
1 Number of nodes in the network (n) 40–80
2 Type of pattern of the main structure
S1 Bus modular (BMC)
S2 Path (PM)
S3 Hierarchical (HE)
S4 Integral (IN)
S5 Cyclical (CY)
3 Number of hubs (k) 1–10
4 Density of hubs (mx) 5–20
5 Type of pattern of hubs (Ty)
Ty1 Hierarchical
Ty2 Bus modular
Ty3 Integral
Ty4 Path
6 Probability that hub’s nodes are sources (Pso) 1/3
7 Probability that hub’s nodes are sinks (Psk) 1/3
8 Redundancy threshold criterion (RTC) 0.5
9 Level of connectivity among hubs (pal) 0.5
7. Application: generation and assessment of
theoretical patterns
The network generator experiments used Monte Carlo techniques to examine the
influence of the parameters onmodularity and robustness under both randomand
targeted attacks. A total of 2,500 instances were simulated for each experimental
run. While experimenting with one parameter, the other parameters of the
generator were randomly varied in the range of the limits set for each parameter or
remained fixed at nominal values as shown in Table 5. The limits of the ranges of
the parameters were derived with respect to the two technical systems (Section 5).
The user can define the limits of the experimental ranges depending on the
purpose behind the use of the network generator. The Monte Carlo approach
based on ranges defined in Table 5 was adopted for all the experiments that are
presented (Sections 7.1 and 7.2). The first author discussed in individual meetings
with the SMEs the experimental results of this section.
7.1. Experimental set-up: varying the main structure pattern
For the following experimental set-up (Table 5), five experiments were performed
for each of the main structure patterns under examination (S1 = bus modular,
S2 = path, S3 = hierarchical, S4 = integral and S5 = cycle). This means for
each experiment the main structure was constant, whereas the other parameters
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Figure 4. Random instance of a hybrid bus-modular main structure network (S1).
Figure 5. Random instance of a hybrid path main structure network (S2).
(1, 3, 4 and 5) were randomly selected for each instance within the predefined
range and options of Table 5. The remaining parameters (6, 7, 8 and 9) were
fixed. For each experiment, the robustness under random and targeted attacks
and the modularity of the simulated networks were calculated. Random instances
are shown in Figures 4–7 as examples of the simulated networks.
Figure 8 shows a reduction in robustness for an increasing number of
random and targeted disruptions for all hybrid patterns. The hybrid ‘integral’
simulated network with a high number of interconnections exhibited the highest
robustness under both targeted and random attacks. However, this high level of
connectivity is not an efficient feasible arrangement; as Chan, Akoglu & Tong
(2014) explained: ‘ideally, a fully connected network is the most robust; however,
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Figure 6. Random instance of a hybrid hierarchical main structure network (S3).
Figure 7. Random instance of a hybrid integral main structure network (S4).
it is not feasible to design such real-world networks due to constraints in physical
space, budget, etc.’ The hybrid bus-modular network had the worst performance
under targeted disruptions. Disruption of the most central component of the bus-
modular pattern influences the whole pattern, leading to increased vulnerability,
although it has acceptable levels of modularity. The ‘cyclical’ pattern has a more
straightforward, low connection, low-cost arrangement, with potentially the most
desirable robustness under targeted disruption. The initial examination of the
results for the simulated cyclical pattern suggests that it could provide improved
robustness behaviour compared to the two naval design systems previously
assessed in Section 5.2.
The simulated cyclical pattern did not have as sharp loss of the robustness
under the four or more target component attacks as that in Figure 3 of the naval
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Figure 8. Robustness calculations varying the main structure patterns.
design systems. The robustness of the architecture patterns to random attacks is
broadly similar, showing an almost linear decline as the number of nodes removed
increased. However, with targeted attacks, all of the patterns showed a rapid
nonlinear reduction in robustness, with variations between the patterns examined.
This implies that the choice of pattern is important, particularly in environments
where target disruptions can occur.
The topology of the design process bipartite network presented in Piccolo
et al. (2018) shares trivial commonalities with the bus-modular simulated network
(Figure 4). The Piccolo et al. (2018) network is larger (259 nodes) than the
networks simulated in this article by a factor of between 3 and 6. Nevertheless,
the decay of robustness presented in Piccolo et al. (2018) has a similar profile to
the results in Figure 8; in particular, targeted attacks of central nodes result in a
much sharper deterioration of robustness in comparison to random attacks. The
fact that there are some similarities even though the measures of robustness are
different and the network architectures have only trivial commonalities is worthy
of further research.
The results (Figure 9) show the modularity assessment. The path (PM),
hierarchical (HE), and cyclical (CY) hybrid patterns provided the best modularity
results, between 0.52 and 0.54, whereas the two technical patterns exhibited a
comparable degree ofmodularity, between 0.63 and 0.48. The integral (IN) pattern
is highly interconnected and could not be readily divided into modules, giving a
Q value close to zero. This experiment with the generator provided an overview of
the effects of the different main structure patterns on robustness and modularity.
In the next step of the study, it was decided further experiments should focus
on the cyclical main structure pattern.
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Figure 9. Modularity calculations varying the main structure patterns.
7.2. Cyclical main structure pattern experiments
The cyclical pattern shares similarities with respect to its configuration with the
two technical systems (Type A and B) presented in Section 5. As was observed
in Section 5.3, the two technical systems have a cyclical network configuration,
showing a loop-style pattern with the main hubs identified and additional
connectivity among the hubs and other components. The existence of closed
loops (cycles) was a key observation in the Type A and B technical systems. In
addition, relevant references were found in the literature that supports further
exploration. For example, Chalfant & Chryssostomidis (2017) discussed ship
propulsion configuration, explaining that there could be two styles, a cyclical and
an integral (mesh): ‘[it] may require closed-loop paths for operability as in lube
oil and chilled water systems, or may allow many redundant paths through a
complexmesh-restorable network as in an electrical distribution system’.Whitney
(2003) argued that patterns (motifs) that generate functions are cyclical (closed
loops) in the context of technological networks such as mechanical assemblies
and electronic circuit. Moreover, a study by Agarwal et al. (2014), which aimed
to identify an appropriate system of system architecture to satisfy multiple
objectives, including robustness and modularity, found that a circular graph was
the best pattern. These reasonsmotivate further experimentation with the cyclical
pattern.
7.2.1. Experimental set-up: varying the number of nodes
The first experiment (Table 6) for the cyclical main structure pattern focused on
variations in the number of nodes of the network and possible effects on the level
of robustness and modularity.
Figure 10 shows a rational behaviour with the robustness response falling as
the number of disruptions increased. There was broadly similar behaviour for
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Table 6. Experimental set-up variable: number of nodes
No. Parameters Experimental set-up
1 Number of nodes in the network (n) n = 40–50 n = 50–60 n = 70–80
Figure 10. Robustness calculations varying the number of nodes (size of network).
Table 7. Modularity calculations varying the number of nodes (size of network)
Hybrid cyclical pattern Modularity
N = 40:50 0.48
N = 50:60 0.51
N = 70:80 0.55
all sizes of the cyclical pattern for both random and targeted disruptions, with
a small reduction in robustness as the size of the main structure was reduced. It
can therefore be deduced that scaling a cyclical pattern will not crucially influence
robustness. With respect to modularity, the Table 7 results indicate that the
modularity increases slightly as the size of the cyclical pattern increases.
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Table 8. Experimental set-up variable: number of hubs
No. Parameters Experimental set-up
3 Number of hubs K = 1–5 K = 6–14 K = 15–20
Table 9. Modularity calculation varying the number of hubs
Hybrid cyclical pattern Modularity
Number of hubs= 1:4 0.57
Number of hubs= 5:7 0.50
Number of hubs= 8:10 0.50
Figure 11. Robustness calculations varying the number of hubs.
From the previous results with a broader size range (from 40 to 80), the degree
of modularity was 0.52. The findings suggests that the size of the main structure
pattern does not significantly affect either its robustness or its modularity.
7.2.2. Experimental set-up: varying the number of hubs
The experimental set-up in Table 8 presents the variation in the number of hubs.
It can be observed that increasing the number of hubs initially protects
the network from targeted hubs but then leads to an increased vulnerability
once the scale of the attack passes a certain threshold (in Figure 11, this
threshold is 10 nodes) whereas for random attacks no such threshold is apparent.
Large-scale targeted attacks will tend to remove complete hubs. In the simulated
network, the increased frequency of hubs also increases the frequency of removal
of interconnections between hubs in target attacks, which might explain the
phenomenon observed here as the removal of these ‘arteries’ proves catastrophic.
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But in random attacks the chances of disrupting an artery are diminished and
the added communicability provided by a plethora of hubs proves beneficial to
robustness. Such contradictory behaviour highlights the need for balance in the
design.
In technical systems, hubs may be designed with spatial separation from each
other because the designer aims to avoid a single disruption affecting more than
one hub simultaneously. In the case of an extended disruption of the system
that can damage more than one hub, the robustness decreases significantly. The
findings suggest that the number of hubs should be carefully considered, given the
expected operational environment of the system: many hubs could be detrimental
to robustness, and so the spatial separation of hubs in terms of the physical design
is fundamental. However, addressing only the spatial location of hubs does not
resolve the problem, as an intelligent attackermay be aware of the location of hubs
and intentionally disrupt them simultaneously. Technical system architectures
have specific structures, where the increased number of hubs suggests increased
redundancy and improved robustness. In network science, the number of hubs is
considered to be a point of vulnerability in scale-free networks (Albert et al. 2000).
However, in the simulated networks small in size (40–80 nodes) andwith a limited
number of hubs, the vulnerabilities introduced by hubs are more considerable
only if an extensive targeted attack occurs in the system, rather than an attack
of a smaller magnitude.
Sosa et al. (2011) argued that ‘the presence of hubs has a significant effect on
system quality (measured by the number of defects in the system)’ and concluded
that there is an ‘optimal presence of hubs whichminimize the number of defects in
the system’. Their work is different from the experiments presented herein, as the
focus of their study is on quality. However, our results provide further evidence
that there is an optimal number of hubs in the design of technical systems. The
redundant hubs are the ones that are readily available to take over the functionality
in the case of a targeted attack on a hub, as they are designed to avoid such
targeted attack effects. However, determining the correct number of hubs in a
technical system is not a straightforward task and requires a careful investigation
and consideration of the expected operational environment in which a system is
designed to survive.
Keeping the number of hubs in the simulated cyclical network small gives a
higher level ofmodularity thanwhen there are a larger number of hubs. Since there
is a constant level of interconnections between hubs in the generator, their number
will increase as the number of hubs increases. The higher interconnectivity
reduces the ability to divide the network pattern into modules, and hence reduces
the modularity.
The experimental findings indicate that a smaller number of hubs positively
affect modularity in the development of coherent modules; however, robustness
falls under targeted attacks. The important finding is that robustness has a cut-off
point, meaning that for disruptions that are extensive inmagnitude, an increase in
the number of hubs in the architecture provokes a sharper decline in robustness.
These experimental findings is used to inform the redesign of Type A
(Section 8). The original designs, Types A and B (Figure 4), show that the level of
robustness of the two naval designs collapses with more than four or five central
components removed. As was previously discussed, a more linear degradation
of robustness is preferable. The naval technical systems have in total four main
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Table 10. Experimental set-up variable: density of hub
No. Parameters Experimental set-up
4 Density of hubs mx = 5–10 mx = 10–15 mx = 15–20
Figure 12. Robustness calculations varying the density of hubs.
hubs (2× LV SWBDs and 2× HV SWBDs). The simulated networks shown in
Figure 11 suggest the possibility of improved robustness by increasing the number
of hubs above five given that disruptions that remove more than ten central
nodes simultaneously are not expected to occur during operational life. The
worst-case scenario in naval design examples only considers single attack events
and not multi-attacks. In this case, increasing the number of hubs can positively
affect robustness under target and random disruptions. This finding can provide
insights to guide the selection of new design options. Section 8 implements this
experimental result in the redesign of the Type A technical system. As another
example, a future warship power system design may have six to eight discrete
power generator modules ‘DG Source feeding HV hub’ configured, separated and
controlled to deliver specific functions on board.
7.2.3. Experimental set-up: varying the density of hub
The experimental set-up in Table 10 is focused on the variation in the density of
hubs.
The density (i.e., the number of source/sink interconnections, for example, the
number of consumers/sinks connected to a hub) of the hubs does not significantly
influence the robustness of the patterns under targeted or random disruptions as
shown in Figure 12. There is a marginal indication that robustness with higher
density hubs is slightly reduced under targeted attacks and slightly increased
following random attacks.
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Table 11. Modularity calculations varying the density of hubs
Hybrid cyclical pattern Modularity
Density of hubs= 5:10 0.56
Density of hubs= 10:15 0.51
Density of hubs= 15:20 0.52
Table 12. Experimental set-up variable: hub pattern
No. Parameters Experimental set-up
5 Type of pattern of hubs Hierarchical Bus modular Integral Path
The results of experiments on the density at the hub level in Table 11 suggest
that the modularity falls slightly to a limiting value as the density of the hub
increases. This may be explained by the increased level of interconnections
between hubs as the hub size increases. The density of hubs does not drastically
influence either the robustness or the modularity of the system architecture. The
experimental findings indicate that the density of hubs is not a significant factor
in influencing the robustness of the architecture. The density of the hub relates to
the number of source and sink nodes connected to the hub. This finding could be
useful when designing the system architecture, because additional or fewer sink
and source components could be added onto the hubs. In practice, the numbers
of sources and sinks at the hub level are considered key elements for designing
redundancy in the architecture. However, the experimental findings suggest that
a reduction in the number of sources and sinks could be an aspect of trade-off in
a future redesign given that other redundancy design strategies are adopted. This
is implemented in the Type A redesign (Section 8), where the number of sources
is reduced at the hub level and an additional hub is designed in the architecture.
7.2.4. Experimental set-up: varying the hub pattern
Table 12 shows an experimental set-up on the variation in the patterns of the hubs.
The robustness of architectures subjected to targeted disruptions was found to
be insensitive to the type of hub pattern style (apart from a path pattern). Path
patterns at the hub level showed the worst robustness under both random and
targeted disruptions, as any loss of node reduced it.
In general, robustness improved as the level of interconnectivity increased.
The simulated networks of this experiments show that a bus-modular hub level
pattern has acceptable performance (Figure 13) while at the main structure level,
a bus modular has the worst performance (Figure 8). Bus-modular-style hub level
patterns are also identified in the two naval design examples. The power and
propulsion expert gave the following example: ‘In ships’ electrical systems there are
separate generators and switchboards. Power to ships’ equipment is taken from the
EDCs, which are located throughout the ship. Each EDC has a changeover switch
connecting either the normal supply from one switchboard or an alternative
supply from the other switchboard. To reduce vulnerability, the switchboard/EDC
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Figure 13. Robustness calculations varying the hub pattern.
Table 13. Modularity calculations varying the hub pattern
Hybrid cyclical pattern Modularity
Hierarchical hubs 0.66
Bus-modular hubs 0.59
Integral hubs 0.29
Path hubs 0.65
cables run on opposite sides of the ship. The interconnections between EDCs and
equipment are typically a single path, which tends to increase system vulnerability.
For some of the critical ship systems, additional changeover switches are located
close to the equipment to provide additional normal and alternative supplies from
adjacent EDCs’. This arrangement suggests two ‘bus-modular’ patterns, with ‘star’
interconnections at a hub level. The choice of hub pattern may have less effect on
robustness in the case of targeted disruptions; however, for random disruptions,
it may be more beneficial to design bus modular or integral hub patterns because
of increasing reliability and availability of engineering systems.
The baseline hybrid cyclical patterns have a modularity of 0.52 (Figure 9) that
is based on random allocations of hub patterns (bus modular, path, hierarchical,
cycle and integral). The results in Table 13 show a significant reduction in
modularity, when it is defined as integral hub patterns (the hub pattern is not
randomly selected). This means that the integral pattern at the hub level can
influence the overall degree of modularity. All of the other hub configurations
show higher modularity when compared with the baseline, indicating also that
the hub pattern is an influential factor in controlling the degree of modularity.
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Table 14. Experimental set-up variable: redundancy threshold criterion
No. Parameters Experimental set-up
8 Redundancy threshold criterion RTC= 0.25 RTC= 0.5 RTC= 1
Figure 14. Robustness calculations varying the redundancy threshold criterion.
7.2.5. Experimental set-up: varying the level of redundancy threshold
criterion
The experimental set-up of Table 14 concentrated on the variation in the
redundancy threshold criterion that relates with the level of redundancy between
source and sink nodes in the system architecture.
The redundancy threshold criterion represents the level of redundancy of
sources: 0.25 = four times the redundancy, 0.5 = double the redundancy and
1.0 = no redundancy. The results in Figure 14 show that double the redundancy
of sources in the architecture improved overall robustness under random and
targeted attacks. However, with four times the redundancy, there was only
marginal improvement in the robustness. The experimental findings suggest a
decreasing benefit in robustness as the level of redundancy is increased above
the double redundancy. In the naval design example, this finding suggests that an
optimum level of redundancy exists, given the associated additional costs, weight,
space requirements and maintenance. The proposed generator can provide an
early indication of the relative merits of levels of redundancy at the initial stage
of design. This may suggest areas where the initial design efforts might examine
new redundancy approaches without compromising robustness. For example, this
finding guided the redesign of Type A (Section 8), which included three instead of
four alternative independent redundancy paths between the source and the sink
to satisfy power functionality.
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Table 15. Experimental set-up variable: level of connectivity between hubs
No. Parameters Experimental set-up
9 Level of connectivity among hubs pal= 0.25 pal= 0.5 pal= 1
Figure 15. Robustness calculations varying the connectivity between hubs.
7.2.6. Experimental set-up: varying the level of connectivity between hubs
Table 15 presents the experimental set-up of varying the level of connectivity
between hubs.
The level of connectivity among hubs was controlled in the proposed
generator using the ‘pal’ parameter. The pal parameter indicates the level of
hub interconnectivity: pal = 0.5 means that 50% of hubs are connected; pal = 1
means that all hubs are interconnected. The results in Figure 15 show that for
high connectivity among hubs, robustness is better for random disruptions than
targeted disruptions. In targeted disruptions with high levels of interconnectivity,
the loss of central nodes reduces the robustness. In random disruptions, the
high levels of hub interconnection provide alternative pathways and a higher
robustness score.
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Table 16. Modularity calculations varying the connectivity between hubs
Hybrid cyclical pattern Modularity
pal = 0. 25 0.55
pal= 0.5 0.53
pal= 1 0.49
Table 17. Modularity calculations for Type A and Type A redesign technical
systems
Technical systems Modularity
Type A 0.63
Type A redesign 0.56
Simulated patterns with less connectivity among hubs were found to be more
robust against targeted attacks than patterns with more connectivity. In contrast,
under random attacks, patterns with high connectivity perform better. This
finding suggests that if there are only a few hubs, then low connectivity between
them can reduce the damage from targeted attacks. This applies to any relatively
small size network whose degrees do not follow a power-law distribution.
With respect to modularity as shown in Table 16, a lower level of connectivity
among hubs improvesmodularity, whereas high connectivity among hubs reduces
the degree of modularity in the simulated networks. The level of connectivity
among hubs was found to be an influential parameter, on the basis of the
experiments performed. The level of connectivity among hubs has different effects
on robustness andmodularity. This experimental finding guided the development
of the redesign of Type A (Section 8): while it is decided to add a hub (HV
Switchboard 3) to the improved design, it was decided that this additional hub
would not directly feed the other hubs.
8. Redesign of technical system Type A
In order to demonstrate the value of the new network generator, a redesign of the
Type A technical system presented in Section 5 is developed. The redesign of Type
A was driven on the experimental results achieved in Section 7. The experimental
findings of Section 7.2.2 indicated that the addition of one HV SWBD would
improve the robustness of the architecture, whereas the findings of Section 7.2.3
imply that the reduction in the number of sources (density of hub) may be an
acceptable trade-off. Section 7.2.5 proposed three alternative independent paths
between sources and sinks for the power function. The experimental findings of
Section 7.2.6 suggested that the additional hub (HV Switchboard 3) should not be
connected directly to the other hubs (HV Switchboards 1 and 2). Following the
experimental findings, the Type A redesign proposal includes one additional HV
SWBD and reduced the total number of DGs from four to three. The redesign of
Type A is shown in Figure 16.
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Figure 16. Technical network Type A redesign.
The redesign of Type A was developed without changing the total number of
system components (one HV SWBD was added and one DG removed) to allow a
comparison of networks of the same size. For the Type A system, the cost of a DG
was higher than the cost of an HV SWBD, which means that the Type A redesign
is a cost-improved solution. Moreover, the Type A redesign involves hub patterns
of a single-sourceDG supplying power to anHVSWBDhub. This is advantageous
as electrical synchronisation problems can be avoided by having only one DG
supply for each HV SWBD (not two DG supplies to one HV SWBD). The simpler
source–hub pattern would improve integration time and cost. The redesign of
Type A was discussed with experts, who verified that the Type A redesign is a
rational and feasible solution.
The results (Figure 17) show a graceful degradation of robustness compared
to the original Type A under targeted central component attacks and also an
improved robustness under random attacks.
However, the modularity results in Table 17 show that the redesign of Type A
has a lower degree of modularity.
Previous designs and expert opinions typically influence decisions on the
number and the connectivity of the components, defining the system architecture,
during the initial design phase. Such decisions have a significant impact on the
time of development, system costs and robust behaviour. Typically the robustness
of the system is assessed for the design chosen, not for alternative options, and a
detailed analysis takes place at the later stage of the design process when more
information is available. Type A redesign demonstrates the value of the novel
network generator to support exploratory and analytical approaches during the
initial system design phase.
9. Reflections
In the design research literature, scholars have simulated networks and compared
themwith the original examples in order to identify areas of improvement. Piccolo
et al. (2018) developed two null models: one that conserves degree distribution
and a second that preserves the number of edges but redistributes them randomly
between nodes. In contrast, the network tool proposed in this article focuses on
a different aspect, namely, the simulation attempts to preserve structural patterns
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Figure 17. Robustness calculations for Type A and Type A redesign technical systems.
(e.g., cyclical pattern) and features (e.g., hubs). It should also be noted that hubs
are identified in the network not simply because they have degree but because
their degree is high relative to their neighbours. In the case of networks without
the power-law degree distribution seen in preferential attachment, this relative
measure is suggested to be more appropriate.
Comparing the simulated networks that the generator produces against the
range of technical networks exhibited in the recent work ofWalsh et al. (2019), it is
demonstrated that the generator populates networks that share attributes of other
existing technical systems. It is observed that the technical networks reported
in Walsh et al. (2019) exemplify instances of the artificial models proposed in
this article. Focusing on the component-based networks reported in Walsh et al.
(2019), it is observed that the bicycle drivetrain has a cyclical hub with hubs linked
to paths, and the automobile drivetrain has a path as a backbone with a bus-
modular hub. The aircraft network has a hybrid structure with a path backbone
and hubs that are generally integral, but there is also a level of interconnection
between hubs (around 25% here).
A limitation of this study is that the robustness problem that is examined
in this article relates to the immediate instance after a disruption and does not
include the dynamic aspects of robustness concerning error propagation and
32/40
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/dsj.2020.6
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 80.6.87.97, on 16 Apr 2020 at 11:42:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
spread. Future works could adapt the generator to dynamically assess robustness.
Moreover, the generality of the proposed network generator remains to be further
investigated. Future research will also include applications of the generator in
different technical system contexts for evaluation and validation purposes.
10. Conclusion
This article presented a network generator as a tool to analyse and improve
robustness of system architectures. The methodology in the article assessed
the level of the robustness and modularity of two naval engineering system
architectures and various simulated networks. The application of the generator
included experiments investigating the effects of variance of its parameters on
robustness and modularity. The experiments focus on varying parameters of the
cyclical main structure pattern as the configurations resembled the two naval
systems.
The proposed generator can help the system architect to develop a set of
candidate theoretical system architectures at the initial design stage, prior to
the development of detailed simulation or prototype models, by motivating
novel paradigms and informing analysis. In theory, the network generator can
stimulate the creation of intentional complexity in the structure of systems, by
populating complex networks with identifiable patterns and features. The ability
to demonstrate early evidence of compliance with the design requirements also
provides an additional benefit for system architects.
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Appendix A
Figure 18. Type A – design structure matrix.
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Figure 19. Type B – design structure matrix.
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Appendix B
Figure 20. Examples of the main structure pattern options (parameter 2 network
generator).
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